




CCHF diagnosis, a challenge ?



**French National Reference Center
for Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers**

Dr Delphine PANNETIER

Workshop on Emerging Infectious Diseases – Istanbul – 26th march 2026



French NRC for VHF

Directed by Pasteur Institut (UBIVE)

Associated Laboratory : Inserm Jean Mérieux BSL4 Laboratory



**Diagnostic Expertise
for RG4 viruses (VHF
and Nipah)**

**Front line in
the French
healthcare
system**

**Advices to health and
security authorities**

**Epidemiological
Surveillance**

Participation to Alert



Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers

Similar clinical forms observed : fever associated with hemorrhages and multiorgans/cardiovascular failure for the most severe cases


Induced by 3 families of RNA viruses

Flavivirus



† <5%

Bunyavirales



† 10-50%



† 10-15%

Filovirus



† 50-90%

No really effective treatment, very limited vaccines

VHF are zoonoses

Diseases that normally affect animals with only accidental transmission to humans via animal reservoirs or arthropod vectors


Arboviruses		Other viruses	
Disease	Vector	Disease	Reservoir
Yellow Fever Dengue Rift Valley Fever	Mosquitoes	Marburg Ebola (Nipah)	Bats
CCHF Kyasanur Omsk	Ticks	Lassa New World VHF FHSR	Rodents

RG4 viruses : human-to-human transmission



The presence of reservoirs and vectors will influence the geographical distribution of VHF

Emergence and geography



VIRUS	YEAR	COUNTRIES
Ebola	2014 2014-2017-2018-2020-2021-2022 2021 2020-2022 2025	Guinea - Sierra Leone - Liberia RDC Guinea Uganda RDC - Uganda
Marburg	2014-2017 2021 2022 2023 2024	Uganda Guinea Ghana Equatorial Guinea – Tanzania Rwanda
Lassa	2016 2017 - 2018 2021 2023 2025 (Lassa-Like)	Benin – Liberia - Nigeria Nigeria - Liberia Guinea Nigeria Chad
CCHF	2014 - 2023 2016 (2013)	Pakistan – Iran – Iraq – Turquie Espagne

 **Public health problem in constant evolution**

Ebola virus example - 1976


Years	Outbreaks	Confirmed	Deaths
1976 – 2010	19	2291	1525
2011 – 2026	18	32722	13909

Before 2010 : outbreaks each 10 years
 Unpredictable West Africa Outbreak 2014-2016
 Epidemics are now occurring almost annually...

- Increase of frequency of outbreaks with a larger population at risk of VHF
- Zoonoses : impact related to climate, societal, and environmental changes
- Easier contact between humans and reservoirs (deforestation; changes in animal habits, population movements, etc.)
- Human-to-human transmission
- Risk of imported cases in Europe (travel, expatriates, NGO staff, medical personnel, military personnel, etc.)
- **Expected emergence of CCHF in the coming years in France : confirmation of the presence of CCHF in ticks in the South of France in 2023**



Role of the One Health strategy + surveillance in preventing outbreaks
Early and specific diagnosis is essential to implement rapid isolation measures and prevent the spread of the epidemic.



sudden onset and biphasic evolution



- Fever, Chills
- Strong Asthenia
- Anorexia
- Headaches
- Arthralgia/Myalgia
- Nausea - Vomiting
- Diarrhea
- Abdominal Pain
- Cough



- Skin Rash - Prostration
- Gastrointestinal / Respiratory / Vascular Disorders



- Internal/External Hemorrhages +++
- Epistaxis, petechia, echymoses
- DIC – Gingival bleedings
- Conjunctivitis - Anuria - Hiccups
- Neurological Signs
- Multivisceral Disorders
- Cardiovascular failure




No or light
haemorrhagic Signs

**Long recovery
and lasting
effects**

Death

- **Significant abnormalities of biological parameters**
- **Changes in cell counts**
 - Important lymphopenia/leukopenia
 - Important thrombocytopenia
- **Coagulation disorders**
 - Increased prothrombin time
 - Fibrinolysis disorders
 - Disseminated intravascular coagulation
- **Increase of hepatic enzymes AST / ALT**
- **Proteinuria, hematuria**
- **Increased creatinine and Creatine Kinase levels**
- **Ionic balance disorder**

VHF : viremia and antibodies




Challenges of VHF diagnosis

- **Essential public health mission : primary care unit awareness is fundamental to recognize clinical forms**
 - Always an emergency
 - Need for rapid protective measures for healthcare staff and contact cases
 - Extremely rigorous and costly isolation measures for patient
- **No/few/bad commercial diagnostic tests : in-house technics are essential**
- **Use only reliable and validated techniques : false-negative or false-positive diagnosis impossible because consequences could be dramatic**
- **Perform VHF diagnosis only when necessary to avoid impacting patient care**



In France VHF NRC : initial diagnosis and confirmation


Choice of techniques to implement depends on the area of exposure, clinical signs, and time since the onset of symptoms



Requirements for diagnostic tests

- **Sensitivity and specificity are mandatory**
 - **Detection of all strains and last circulating strains essential (human, reservoir, vector)**
 - **Difficulties with high genetic diversity of VHF viruses**
- **Emergence of new strains**

2007 - Bundibugyo Emergence
not detected with the historic filovirus
RT-PCR




Diagnostic Tests Limitations

2025 - Lasli (Lassa-Like Virus) Emergence from Chad : only ½ probes of the Altona kit detect it /
No detection with the Biofire Kit

Homologie avec LASV

Segment S : < 76 %


Segment L : < 68 %



Diagnostic Tests Limitations

Issues With CCHF

- **2021 Spain** : Altona kit did not detect the virus in a patient
- **2023 France (Ticks)** : RT-PCR from our colleagues does not detect the strain that circulates in ticks
- **2023 Iran** : a study from Salehi-Vaziri et al (Pasteur Institut Teheran) reports a clinical case with in-house RT-PCR positive but Real-Star Altona kit negative



France




FIGURE 1: Neighbor-joining phylogenetic tree with bootstrap 5000 and Kimura 2-parameter substitution model indicating that the strain Iran 9334 belongs to CCHFV genotype Africa 3.

Iran

Diagnostic Tests Limitations

Commercial kits : technical data difficult/impossible to obtain

Tested with only few strains NOT REAL STRAINS → not accurate to evaluate sensitivity and specificity in real samples (blood)

Table 10. Limit of Detection for BioFire Global Fever Special Pathogens Panel Test Results

Global Fever Special Pathogens Panel Analyte	Isolate Tested	Live/Inactivated	LoD Concentration	
			Copies/mL ¹	Units/mL
BACTERIA				
<i>Bacillus anthracis</i>	Ames35	Live	4.2E+01	N/A
<i>Francisella tularensis</i>	SCHU S4	Inactivated	1.2E+03	N/A
<i>Leptospira</i> spp.	<i>interrogans</i> : serovar icterohaemorrhagiae, Serotype: Budapest	Live	3.4E+02	N/A
<i>Yersinia pestis</i>	A1122	Live	1.3E+02	N/A
VIRUSES				
Chikungunya virus	180422	Inactivated	5.5E+02	3.6E-01 units/mL
Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus	Strain IbAr10200	Inactivated	6.4E+00	N/A
Dengue virus	DENV-1: Hawaii	Live	2.2E+02	N/A
	DENV-2-1: New Guinea C	Live	3.4E+02	N/A
	DENV-2-2: Dak AR A1247	Live	2.7E+03	1.5E+02 TCID ₅₀ /mL
	DENV-3: H87	Live	1.3E+02	3.7E+00 units/mL
	DENV-4: H241	Live	6.4E+01	1.8E+02 units/mL
<i>Ebolavirus</i> spp.	Bundibugyo: 200706291 Uganda	Inactivated	7.0E+04	N/A
	Tai Forest: Cote d'Ivoire 11/27/94	Inactivated	8.3E+03	N/A
	Reston: 119810 RIID (MKY 53) (prototype 1989)	Inactivated	2.7E+04	N/A
	Sudan: Boniface	Inactivated	1.1E+04	N/A
Lassa virus	Zaire: Gueckedou/Guinea C07	Inactivated	1.0E+02	1.5E+02 PFU/mL
	Josiah	Inactivated	5.6E+04	N/A
<i>Marburgvirus</i>	Marburg virus: Musoke	Inactivated	5.0E+02	N/A
	Ravn virus: Kenya Ravn	Inactivated	2.6E+02	N/A
West Nile virus	NY 2001-6263 (Lineage 1)	Inactivated	1.1E+03	2.7E+01 units/mL
	B-956 Uganda (Lineage 2)	Inactivated	2.3E+04	6.2E+00 units/mL
Yellow fever virus	Strain 17D	Live attenuated	1.2E+02	1.2E+01 TCID ₅₀ /mL
PROTOZOA				
<i>Leishmania</i> spp.	<i>donovani</i> : 9515 (MHOM/IN/95/9515)	Live	1.0E+01	2.2E+01 cells/mL
	<i>falciparum</i> , IPC 4884 Pursat Cambodia 2011	Live	1.8E+02	N/A
<i>Plasmodium</i> spp.	<i>knowlesi</i> , H strain	gDNA	2.4E+01	20 pg/mL
	<i>malariae</i> (Clinical Specimen)	Live	1.9E+02	2.3E-01 cells/mL
	<i>ovale</i> , <i>wallerikeri</i> (Clinical Specimen)	Live	2.4E+02	N/A
	<i>vivax</i> , Strain Chesson	Live	1.5E+02	N/A
<i>Plasmodium falciparum</i>	IPC 4884 Pursat Cambodia 2011	Live	1.8E+02	N/A
<i>Plasmodium vivax/ovale</i>	<i>ovale</i> , <i>wallerikeri</i> (Clinical Specimen)	Live	2.4E+02	N/A
	<i>vivax</i> , Strain Chesson	Live	1.5E+02	N/A

¹ Stock concentrations determined using commercially available quantitative real-time PCR assay kits.

BioFire
FILMARRAY

- **Be ready as soon as possible, before human emergence if possible : importance of the One Health Strategy**
- **No/few commercial kits or not really validated :
BE REALLY CAREFUL USING IT**
- **Diversity of VHF viruses with regular emergence of new species and new variants → updating and validation of techniques necessary**
- **Need for epidemiological surveillance and detailed, up-to-date epidemiological knowledge about GR4 agents → sharing informations about diagnosis, epidemiology and kits is very important**
- **Accreditation of laboratory tests can be difficult due to a lack of samples when you are not in endemic area**
 - **French MOT regulation concerning VHF viruses to be taken into account (time-consuming administrative burden / influence on management of confirmed cases)**
- **New European IVD regulation on in vitro diagnostic tests : probleme for in house tests to prove they are better than commercial kits**



Thank you